The types of cases that end up in juvenile courts are defined by state law. As such, the jurisdiction of juvenile courts varies from state to state. Such jurisdiction is usually based on two factors: the age of the offender and the act committed.
In juvenile cases, there is a youngest age of when a juvenile court can assume jurisdiction and an oldest age of when a juvenile is released. Wide discrepancies exist among states—from a youngest age of 6 years to an oldest age of 24 years. Most states, however, have a youngest age of 10 years and an oldest age of 17 years for juvenile court jurisdiction. Juveniles who are younger than the youngest age when they commit criminal acts are usually informally processed by law enforcement or placed in the state social welfare system. Offenders above the oldest age are prosecuted as adult criminals. The youngest and oldest ages apply to the time the act was committed, not when the juvenile was caught or tried in court. Despite these ages, some states provide that some juveniles can be kept in a juvenile institution or supervised until they reach an older age, such as 18, 21, or 24. This is particularly true in juvenile delinquency cases when state authorities believe there is a need for continued supervision. Coupled with the age of the offender, jurisdiction of juvenile courts is also determined by the act committed by the juvenile.
Juvenile acts that trigger court involvement consist of two types: juvenile delinquency and conduct in need of supervision (CINS). Each state determines what acts come under each category. Juvenile delinquency acts are those that are punishable under the state’s penal code. Examples include murder, robbery, burglary, assault, and any other act considered criminal in that state. In 2002, juvenile courts in the United States handled an estimated 1.6 million juvenile delinquency cases [1]. Most of these cases were referred to the juvenile courts by law enforcement agencies. In contrast, CINS are acts that would not be punishable if committed by adults. These are usually status offenses, meaning they are punished because of their status, which in these cases is their age. Status offenses include such categories as truancy, running away from home, tobacco use, inhalant use, curfew violation, and underage drinking [1]. Compared to juvenile delinquency cases, law enforcement agencies refer very few CINS cases to court. In 2002, only 55 percent of cases in juvenile courts were referred to them by law enforcement agencies. The rest arrived to the courts via social services agencies, victims, probation officers, schools, or parents. According to Snyder and Sickmund, “In many jurisdictions, agencies other than juvenile courts are responsible for handling status offense cases. In some communities, for example, family crisis units, county attorneys, and social services agencies have assumed this responsibility” [1].
One issue that has been raised with the jurisdiction of juvenile courts by both ends of the political spectrum has been the retention of offenders in juvenile correctional facilities past the age of 18. As mentioned earlier, some states provide juvenile courts the right to retain jurisdiction of offenders after reaching early adulthood. Those who support a more punitive approach in juvenile justice consider retaining jurisdiction as harmful to society, while others consider it destructive to the juveniles themselves. Those who support a more punitive model of juvenile justice believe that once they reach adulthood offenders should be transferred to adult prisons instead of retained in juvenile facilities. Those who believe that retained jurisdiction is destructive to juveniles argue that in some cases, some juveniles can spend more time in a juvenile correctional facility than an adult spends locked away in an adult prison for a similar offense. Both assessments are valid, so one alternative that could be considered is the creation of a correctional system specifically designed for young adults. For example, a correctional system in which offenders are between the ages of 18 and 25 and separate from both the juvenile and adult systems would fulfill the desires of both of these ideological fractions. From the punitive model’s perspective, the offender would still be punished while removed from younger, more impressionable juveniles. From the other model’s perspective, with a provision set limiting the amount of time spent in this secondary correctional system, offenders would not spend an unequal amount of time under state supervision.
Source:
[1] Snyder, M., & Sickmund, M. (2008). Juvenile offenders and victims: 2006 national report. Washington, DC: Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention.
Wednesday, December 2, 2009
Tuesday, December 1, 2009
Blog Post #7: Disproportionate Minority Confinement
Disproportionate Minority Confinement (DMC) refers to the problem of overrepresentation of minority youth at different stages in the juvenile justice system [1]. The concept of DMC has been expanded in recent years to include disproportionate contact as well as confinement. DMC exists in most states and at all decision points. It is greater for African Americans than Hispanics and is often greater in states where there are smaller minority populations [2]. Research in DMC has yielded varying results. In earlier studies, some found no effects, while others found either direct or indirect race effects during intake, detention, probation, and confinement. Recent research has focused on identifying effective strategies for reducing DMC and examining it in the context of race and gender, at multiple stages and inclusive of Blacks, Latino/as, and American Indians.
Several plausible explanations exist as to why DMC exists at several stages in juvenile justice. First, juvenile justice has always been a racialized system [3]. Feld (1999) cited race and the macrostructural transformation of cities as two societal-level factors important for understanding juvenile justice policies and practices. Specifically, Feld referred to the racial segregation in urban areas and the deindustrialization of cites that has occurred during the last few decades [4]. Feld (1999) stated, “As African Americans became urban Americans and the public attributed increases in crime primarily to urban Black youth, race and crime intersected to produce more punitive juvenile justice policies” [4]. Another explanation is that within a racialized system, law enforcement and others within juvenile justice hold stereotypical views of minority youth which often leads to differential treatment.
In 1988, Congress formerly addressed the DMC issue by amending the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (JJDP) Act of 1974. Under the amendment, any state receiving federal funding via formula grants was required to determine whether DMC existed and, if it did, tackle the problem. Four years later Congress made DMC a core requirement of the JJDP Act, which mandated compliance as a condition of funding, One year earlier, in 1991, OJJDP began to assist states in addressing DMC issues [5]. OJJDP developed an equation for determining the extent of minority overrepresentation, which became known as the “DMC index.” The DMC index is a ratio of the percentage of the confined minority juvenile population divided by the percentage of minority juveniles in the general population. According to Leiber (2002), “OJJDP has adopted a judicious approach to implementation of DMC, which appears to follow the ‘spirit’ of the mandate and attempts to make inroads—‘to get something done’ rather than accomplishing ‘nothing at all’” [2]. OJJDP has developed a “problem-solving process” which involves several actions, including assigning organizational responsibility, identifying the extent to which DMC exists, assessing the reason for DMC if it exists, developing an intervention plan, evaluating the effectiveness of strategies to address DMC, and monitoring DMC trends over time [5].
Future efforts to reduce DMC will require federal, state, and local officials to continue to recognize the importance of this problem for youth, families, communities, and juvenile justice. One group helping to recognize the importance of DMC is the W. Haywood Burns Institute, which assists communities in developing strategies to reduce the number of minority youth in detention [6]. As Pope and Feyerherm (1990) suggested, the DMC problem and race effects will not end until structural and economic factors that contribute to youth involvement in delinquency are recognized and addressed [7]. Thus, future research on DMC should focus on these issues.
Sources:
[1] Snyder, M., & Sickmund, M. (2008). Juvenile offenders and victims: 2006 national report. Washington, DC: Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention.
[2] Leiber, M. J. (2002). Disproportionate minority confinement (DMC) of youth: An analysis of state and federal efforts to address the issue. Crime & Delinquency, 48, 3-45.
[3] Ward, G. (2001). Color lines of social control: Juvenile justice administration in a racialized social system, 1825-2000. University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.
[4] Feld, B. (1999). Bad kids: Race and the transformation of the juvenile court. New York: Oxford University Press.
[5] Devine, P., Coolbaugh, K., & Jenkins, S. (1998). Disproportionate minority confinement: Lessons from five states. Washington, DC: Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention.
[6] Bell, J. (2005). Solvable problem: Reducing the disproportionality of youths of color in juvenile detention facilities. Corrections Today, 67, 80-83.
[7] Pope, C. E., & Feyerherm, W. H. (1990). Minority status and juvenile justice processing: An assessment of the research literature, Parts I & II. Criminal Justice Abstracts, 22, 327-336 (Part I); 22, 527-542 (Part II).
Several plausible explanations exist as to why DMC exists at several stages in juvenile justice. First, juvenile justice has always been a racialized system [3]. Feld (1999) cited race and the macrostructural transformation of cities as two societal-level factors important for understanding juvenile justice policies and practices. Specifically, Feld referred to the racial segregation in urban areas and the deindustrialization of cites that has occurred during the last few decades [4]. Feld (1999) stated, “As African Americans became urban Americans and the public attributed increases in crime primarily to urban Black youth, race and crime intersected to produce more punitive juvenile justice policies” [4]. Another explanation is that within a racialized system, law enforcement and others within juvenile justice hold stereotypical views of minority youth which often leads to differential treatment.
In 1988, Congress formerly addressed the DMC issue by amending the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (JJDP) Act of 1974. Under the amendment, any state receiving federal funding via formula grants was required to determine whether DMC existed and, if it did, tackle the problem. Four years later Congress made DMC a core requirement of the JJDP Act, which mandated compliance as a condition of funding, One year earlier, in 1991, OJJDP began to assist states in addressing DMC issues [5]. OJJDP developed an equation for determining the extent of minority overrepresentation, which became known as the “DMC index.” The DMC index is a ratio of the percentage of the confined minority juvenile population divided by the percentage of minority juveniles in the general population. According to Leiber (2002), “OJJDP has adopted a judicious approach to implementation of DMC, which appears to follow the ‘spirit’ of the mandate and attempts to make inroads—‘to get something done’ rather than accomplishing ‘nothing at all’” [2]. OJJDP has developed a “problem-solving process” which involves several actions, including assigning organizational responsibility, identifying the extent to which DMC exists, assessing the reason for DMC if it exists, developing an intervention plan, evaluating the effectiveness of strategies to address DMC, and monitoring DMC trends over time [5].
Future efforts to reduce DMC will require federal, state, and local officials to continue to recognize the importance of this problem for youth, families, communities, and juvenile justice. One group helping to recognize the importance of DMC is the W. Haywood Burns Institute, which assists communities in developing strategies to reduce the number of minority youth in detention [6]. As Pope and Feyerherm (1990) suggested, the DMC problem and race effects will not end until structural and economic factors that contribute to youth involvement in delinquency are recognized and addressed [7]. Thus, future research on DMC should focus on these issues.
Sources:
[1] Snyder, M., & Sickmund, M. (2008). Juvenile offenders and victims: 2006 national report. Washington, DC: Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention.
[2] Leiber, M. J. (2002). Disproportionate minority confinement (DMC) of youth: An analysis of state and federal efforts to address the issue. Crime & Delinquency, 48, 3-45.
[3] Ward, G. (2001). Color lines of social control: Juvenile justice administration in a racialized social system, 1825-2000. University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.
[4] Feld, B. (1999). Bad kids: Race and the transformation of the juvenile court. New York: Oxford University Press.
[5] Devine, P., Coolbaugh, K., & Jenkins, S. (1998). Disproportionate minority confinement: Lessons from five states. Washington, DC: Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention.
[6] Bell, J. (2005). Solvable problem: Reducing the disproportionality of youths of color in juvenile detention facilities. Corrections Today, 67, 80-83.
[7] Pope, C. E., & Feyerherm, W. H. (1990). Minority status and juvenile justice processing: An assessment of the research literature, Parts I & II. Criminal Justice Abstracts, 22, 327-336 (Part I); 22, 527-542 (Part II).
Monday, November 30, 2009
Blog Post #6: Delinquency Prevention Programs
What works in preventing juvenile delinquency?
For years, the federal government has provided billions of dollars to state and local governments to assist them in their efforts to prevent crime [1]. However, the amount spent on prevention programs is not nearly the amount spent on punishment and secure confinement. {Refer to Blog Post #2} In this decade though, several delinquency programs have emerged and are being funded by Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention. According to Taylor Greene and Penn (2005), the focus might be shifting from punishment to prevention in juvenile justice partly due to the high cost of “get tough” policies that do not necessarily work [2]. Howell (2003) identified many juvenile justice programs and strategies that do not work, including shock incarceration, drug abuse resistance education, zero-tolerance policies and incarceration of juveniles in adult prisons [3]. Although we know more about what does not work today, we still do not know enough about what does work.
Twelve years ago, Sherman et al. (1997) conducted a study of factors relating to juvenile crime and the effectiveness of prevention programs on youth violence. They concluded that, although some programs work, some do not, others are promising, and there is a need to identify what works in areas of concentrated poverty where homicides are prevalent. It is also important to know what works in delinquency prevention in any community where there is a heightened problem of fear, violence, and victimization [1]. One group that attempts to find out what works in delinquency prevention is the Center for the Study and Prevention of Violence. Since 1996, the Center for the Study and Prevention of Violence has been identifying and evaluating violence prevention efforts. The center selects “Blueprint Model Programs” based on several criteria for effectiveness. The criterion includes evidence of a deterrent effect with a solid research design and reproduction of the program in another place [4]. The center also selects “Promising Programs” which are required to only meet the first criteria. At this time, there are 11 Blueprint Model Programs and 19 Promising Programs. The Blueprint Model Programs include Big Brothers Big Sisters of America, Multisystemic Therapy, Olweus Bullying Prevention Program, Project Towards No Drug Abuse, and Life Skills Training [4].
In terms of how these programs can be integrated with juvenile justice systems throughout the country, Howell (2003) provided a “comprehensive strategy framework” for incorporating delinquency prevention into the juvenile justice system. The keys to this strategy are prevention, effective early intervention with at-risk children and graduated sanctions for youth in the juvenile justice system [3]. The comprehensive strategy is based on research and has been applied in many jurisdictions. It utilizes a developmental prevention approach that focuses on risk factors in the individual, family, school, and community.
Although it is easy to forget the fact that the vast majority of the juveniles in our country are not delinquent regardless of their race, class, and gender, we should remember that many parents, teachers, counselors, and community-based organizations are dedicated to the proper development of juveniles across the nation. It makes much more sense to invest society’s resources into education, health, and delinquency prevention than it does to invest into juvenile correctional facilities. Investing in delinquency prevention, however, will require the identification of prevention programs that work, can be reproduced in other areas of the country, and that can be sufficiently funded on a continual basis.
Sources:
[1] Sherman, L.W., Gottfredson, D., MacKenzie, D., Eck, J. P., Reuter, P., & Bushway, S. (Eds.). (1997). Preventing crime: What works, what doesn’t what’s promising. Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice.
[2] Taylor Greene, H., & Penn, E. (2005). Reducing juvenile delinquency: Lessons learned. Race and juvenile justice. Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press.
[3] Howell, J.C. (2003). Preventing and reducing juvenile delinquency: A comprehensive framework. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE.
[4] Center for the Study and Prevention of Violence. (2008). Blueprints for Violence Prevention. University of Colorado at Boulder. http://www.colorado.edu/cspv/blueprints/index.html
For years, the federal government has provided billions of dollars to state and local governments to assist them in their efforts to prevent crime [1]. However, the amount spent on prevention programs is not nearly the amount spent on punishment and secure confinement. {Refer to Blog Post #2} In this decade though, several delinquency programs have emerged and are being funded by Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention. According to Taylor Greene and Penn (2005), the focus might be shifting from punishment to prevention in juvenile justice partly due to the high cost of “get tough” policies that do not necessarily work [2]. Howell (2003) identified many juvenile justice programs and strategies that do not work, including shock incarceration, drug abuse resistance education, zero-tolerance policies and incarceration of juveniles in adult prisons [3]. Although we know more about what does not work today, we still do not know enough about what does work.
Twelve years ago, Sherman et al. (1997) conducted a study of factors relating to juvenile crime and the effectiveness of prevention programs on youth violence. They concluded that, although some programs work, some do not, others are promising, and there is a need to identify what works in areas of concentrated poverty where homicides are prevalent. It is also important to know what works in delinquency prevention in any community where there is a heightened problem of fear, violence, and victimization [1]. One group that attempts to find out what works in delinquency prevention is the Center for the Study and Prevention of Violence. Since 1996, the Center for the Study and Prevention of Violence has been identifying and evaluating violence prevention efforts. The center selects “Blueprint Model Programs” based on several criteria for effectiveness. The criterion includes evidence of a deterrent effect with a solid research design and reproduction of the program in another place [4]. The center also selects “Promising Programs” which are required to only meet the first criteria. At this time, there are 11 Blueprint Model Programs and 19 Promising Programs. The Blueprint Model Programs include Big Brothers Big Sisters of America, Multisystemic Therapy, Olweus Bullying Prevention Program, Project Towards No Drug Abuse, and Life Skills Training [4].
In terms of how these programs can be integrated with juvenile justice systems throughout the country, Howell (2003) provided a “comprehensive strategy framework” for incorporating delinquency prevention into the juvenile justice system. The keys to this strategy are prevention, effective early intervention with at-risk children and graduated sanctions for youth in the juvenile justice system [3]. The comprehensive strategy is based on research and has been applied in many jurisdictions. It utilizes a developmental prevention approach that focuses on risk factors in the individual, family, school, and community.
Although it is easy to forget the fact that the vast majority of the juveniles in our country are not delinquent regardless of their race, class, and gender, we should remember that many parents, teachers, counselors, and community-based organizations are dedicated to the proper development of juveniles across the nation. It makes much more sense to invest society’s resources into education, health, and delinquency prevention than it does to invest into juvenile correctional facilities. Investing in delinquency prevention, however, will require the identification of prevention programs that work, can be reproduced in other areas of the country, and that can be sufficiently funded on a continual basis.
Sources:
[1] Sherman, L.W., Gottfredson, D., MacKenzie, D., Eck, J. P., Reuter, P., & Bushway, S. (Eds.). (1997). Preventing crime: What works, what doesn’t what’s promising. Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice.
[2] Taylor Greene, H., & Penn, E. (2005). Reducing juvenile delinquency: Lessons learned. Race and juvenile justice. Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press.
[3] Howell, J.C. (2003). Preventing and reducing juvenile delinquency: A comprehensive framework. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE.
[4] Center for the Study and Prevention of Violence. (2008). Blueprints for Violence Prevention. University of Colorado at Boulder. http://www.colorado.edu/cspv/blueprints/index.html
Blog Post #5: Female Juvenile Delinquency
Although it receives much more attention today than in the past, female juvenile delinquency is not a new phenomenon. This increased attention is partly due to an increase in female arrests and court referrals for serious crimes. During the 1980s and early 1990s, arrests for the two offenses of aggravated assaults and other assaults, increased more for both males and females than other violent crimes [1]. It is important to keep in mind that violent crimes are only a small fraction of juvenile arrests and that they have declined in recent years. Also, more males than females are arrested for these violent offenses. For example, in 2006, 40 female and 724 male juveniles were arrested for murder [2]. In regards to female juvenile arrest patterns, not much has changed during the past 25 years: “Females have typically been arrested for the following offenses: running away, larceny-theft, liquor law violations, curfew violations, disorderly conduct, other assaults, and the catch all category ‘all other offenses’” [1]. Although patterns of female arrests have not changed much over time, the proportion of females referred to juvenile court for delinquency cases has changed. In 1989, 19 percent of female juvenile cases were referred to juvenile court. By 1998, the percentage increased to 24 percent. The percentage of cases referred for offenses against the person increased from 20 percent in 1989 to 28 percent by 1998 [3]. Female person offense cases increased 22 percent between 1994 and 2004. In 2004, females accounted for 17 percent of delinquency, 20 percent of drug violation, 17 percent of property, 18 percent of public order, and 30 percent of person offense cases in juvenile courts [4]. Females comprised 44 percent of petitioned status offense cases, primarily for running away [5]. So, with arrest patterns remaining the same for female juveniles, what then, is causing this increase in the number of referred cases to juvenile court?
Considering the fact that over the past few decades American society has steadily increased its emphasis on gender equality, it can be argued that law enforcement and the juvenile justice system has begun to hold delinquent girls more accountable for their discretions. Consider the studies of Chesney-Lind & Shelden, 2004; Deschenes & Esbensen, 1999; Howell, 2003. These studies found that although the extent of female delinquency is less than male delinquency, patterns of behavior and risk factors for both groups are quite similar. For example, academic failure, dropping out of school, substance abuse, poverty, and family problems are risk factors for both sexes [1], [6], [7]. In another study by Carr et al., researchers examined official responses to delinquency in two single-sex minimum-security residential programs and a coed aftercare program in an Alabama county. They concluded that “the girls’ treatment facility confined more girls for less serious offenses than the boys’ program” [8].
Taking into account these studies’ findings that risk factors have been similar for both sexes all along and in some cases girls have been punished more so than boys, then an increase in accountability towards female juveniles by the juvenile justice system could explain this increase in the number of referred cases to juvenile court.
Sources:
[1] Chesney-Lind, M., & Shelden, R. G. (2004) Girls, delinquency, and juvenile justice. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
[2] Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2006) Crime in the United States, 2006. http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2006/arrests/index.html
[3] Puzzanchera, C., Stahl, A., Finnegan, T.A., Tierney, N., & Snyder, H. (2003a). Juvenile court statistics, 1998. Washington, DC: Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention.
[4] Stahl, A.L. (2008a) Delinquency cases in juvenile court, 2004. Washington, DC: Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention.
[5] Stahl, A.L. (2008a) Petitioned status offense cases in juvenile court, 2004. Washington, DC: Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention.
[6] Deschenes, E. P., & Esbensen, F.A. (1999). Violence among girls: Does gang membership make a difference? Female gangs in America. Chicago: Lakeview Press.
[7] Howell, J.C. (2003) Preventing and reducing juvenile delinquency: A comprehensive framework. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE.
[8] Carr, N.T., Hudson, K., Hanks, R.S., & Hunt A.N. (2008). Gender effects along the juvenile justice system: Evidence of a gendered organization. Feminist Criminology, 3, 25-43.
Considering the fact that over the past few decades American society has steadily increased its emphasis on gender equality, it can be argued that law enforcement and the juvenile justice system has begun to hold delinquent girls more accountable for their discretions. Consider the studies of Chesney-Lind & Shelden, 2004; Deschenes & Esbensen, 1999; Howell, 2003. These studies found that although the extent of female delinquency is less than male delinquency, patterns of behavior and risk factors for both groups are quite similar. For example, academic failure, dropping out of school, substance abuse, poverty, and family problems are risk factors for both sexes [1], [6], [7]. In another study by Carr et al., researchers examined official responses to delinquency in two single-sex minimum-security residential programs and a coed aftercare program in an Alabama county. They concluded that “the girls’ treatment facility confined more girls for less serious offenses than the boys’ program” [8].
Taking into account these studies’ findings that risk factors have been similar for both sexes all along and in some cases girls have been punished more so than boys, then an increase in accountability towards female juveniles by the juvenile justice system could explain this increase in the number of referred cases to juvenile court.
Sources:
[1] Chesney-Lind, M., & Shelden, R. G. (2004) Girls, delinquency, and juvenile justice. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
[2] Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2006) Crime in the United States, 2006. http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2006/arrests/index.html
[3] Puzzanchera, C., Stahl, A., Finnegan, T.A., Tierney, N., & Snyder, H. (2003a). Juvenile court statistics, 1998. Washington, DC: Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention.
[4] Stahl, A.L. (2008a) Delinquency cases in juvenile court, 2004. Washington, DC: Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention.
[5] Stahl, A.L. (2008a) Petitioned status offense cases in juvenile court, 2004. Washington, DC: Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention.
[6] Deschenes, E. P., & Esbensen, F.A. (1999). Violence among girls: Does gang membership make a difference? Female gangs in America. Chicago: Lakeview Press.
[7] Howell, J.C. (2003) Preventing and reducing juvenile delinquency: A comprehensive framework. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE.
[8] Carr, N.T., Hudson, K., Hanks, R.S., & Hunt A.N. (2008). Gender effects along the juvenile justice system: Evidence of a gendered organization. Feminist Criminology, 3, 25-43.
Sunday, November 29, 2009
Blog Post #4: Juveniles and the Death Penalty
Should juveniles be executed?
Today there are no juveniles under sentence of death as a result of the 2005 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Roper v. Simmons. In 2004, the Supreme Court agreed to hear Roper v. Simmons (2005) after the Supreme Court of Missouri ruled that the death penalty for juveniles violates the U.S. Constitution’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment [1]. Roper v. Simmons (2005) required the U.S. Supreme Court to decide whether the lower court could reject the previously held standard set by the Supreme Court and whether the death penalty for a 17-year-old offender violated the Eighth Amendment [2]. In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court ruled that executing juveniles is unconstitutional and as a result, death sentences for juveniles are now invalid. The close decision in this case is indicative of the lack of consensus on this issue.
Even before the Roper v. Simmons decision, opposition to the execution of juveniles seemed to be increasing. Many organizations including the American Bar Association, the American Psychiatric Association, the Child Welfare League of America, and the Children’s Defense Fund were opposed to the death penalty for juveniles [3]. Sixty-nine percent of Americans responding to a Gallup Poll survey opposed the execution of juveniles [4] and several Supreme Court justices were opposed to the death penalty as well [5].
Prior to the Roper v. Simmons (2005) decision, the U.S. Supreme Court had decided several juvenile death penalty cases, including Thompson v. Oklahoma (1988), Stanford v. Kentucky (1989), Wilkins v. Missouri (1989), and Atkins v. Virginia (2002). In the cases of Stanford and Wilkins, the Court ruled that the death penalty for juveniles who were at least 16 years old at the time of their offense did not violate the Eighth Amendment. At that time, the Court left it up to the states to decide whether they would execute juveniles at age 16 or 17 because there was no national consensus on the issue [6].
In previous rulings, Justices John Paul Stevens, David H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen G. Breyer cited new scientific data pointing to biophysical explanations for adolescents’ diminished cognitive capabilities. They wrote in an amicus supporting Simmons, “Older adolescents are not simply miniature adults, with less experience or wisdom. They are also not as equipped as adults to engage in moral reasoning and adjust their conduct accordingly” [7]. According to the American Medical Association and American Psychiatric Association, 16- and 17-year-olds are physically incapable of making judgments as well as adults and therefore not as culpable [7]. Some, however, disagree with this assessment and argue that as a matter of justice, some juveniles should be executed.
According to Robert Blecker, a professor of criminal law at New York Law School, the very fact that some juveniles commit atrocious crimes merits the option of capital punishment. He states, “There are some people who kill so cruelly and callously and with such wanton depravity that they deserve to die, and we have an obligation to execute them,” but that juvenile executions should be done “only for the worst of the worst” [7]. For other supporters of the juvenile death penalty, it’s not a matter of forgiveness but a matter of deterrence.
Dianne Clements, founder of the Texas-based criminal justice reform organization Justice for All, believes, “You can absolutely forgive the offender and have no issue with that person being executed.” In 1991, her 13-year-old son was shot and killed by another juvenile. She says, “Executed killers do not harm again…If you execute somebody, they’re deterred” [7].
With the Supreme Court’s decision in Roper v. Simmons, this contested issue was legally settled, but as demonstrated, each side of the argument has its own merits. Socially, however, this argument will probably continue to exist over time, especially when atrocious murders are committed by juveniles and portrayed in the news media. Nonetheless, when the United States is the last Western societal nation to ban the death penalty [7], this in itself should be enough to show that this ruling was long overdue.
Sources:
[1] Simmons v. Roper, S.C. 84454 (2003).
[2] Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
[3] American Bar Association. (2004) Christopher Simmons. http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/juvjus/simmons.html
[4] Death Penalty Information Center. (2004). U.S. Supreme Court: Roper v. Simmons. http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org
[5] Greenberger, R.S. (2002, October 11). The economy: Supreme Court narrowly refuses to consider death penalty plea. The Wall Street Journal, p. A2.
[6] Gabbidon, S. L., & Greene, H. T. (2009). Race and Crime (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE
[7] Roh, J. (2005). Juvenile Death Penalty: Fair or Unfair?. http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,148888,00.html
Today there are no juveniles under sentence of death as a result of the 2005 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Roper v. Simmons. In 2004, the Supreme Court agreed to hear Roper v. Simmons (2005) after the Supreme Court of Missouri ruled that the death penalty for juveniles violates the U.S. Constitution’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment [1]. Roper v. Simmons (2005) required the U.S. Supreme Court to decide whether the lower court could reject the previously held standard set by the Supreme Court and whether the death penalty for a 17-year-old offender violated the Eighth Amendment [2]. In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court ruled that executing juveniles is unconstitutional and as a result, death sentences for juveniles are now invalid. The close decision in this case is indicative of the lack of consensus on this issue.
Even before the Roper v. Simmons decision, opposition to the execution of juveniles seemed to be increasing. Many organizations including the American Bar Association, the American Psychiatric Association, the Child Welfare League of America, and the Children’s Defense Fund were opposed to the death penalty for juveniles [3]. Sixty-nine percent of Americans responding to a Gallup Poll survey opposed the execution of juveniles [4] and several Supreme Court justices were opposed to the death penalty as well [5].
Prior to the Roper v. Simmons (2005) decision, the U.S. Supreme Court had decided several juvenile death penalty cases, including Thompson v. Oklahoma (1988), Stanford v. Kentucky (1989), Wilkins v. Missouri (1989), and Atkins v. Virginia (2002). In the cases of Stanford and Wilkins, the Court ruled that the death penalty for juveniles who were at least 16 years old at the time of their offense did not violate the Eighth Amendment. At that time, the Court left it up to the states to decide whether they would execute juveniles at age 16 or 17 because there was no national consensus on the issue [6].
In previous rulings, Justices John Paul Stevens, David H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen G. Breyer cited new scientific data pointing to biophysical explanations for adolescents’ diminished cognitive capabilities. They wrote in an amicus supporting Simmons, “Older adolescents are not simply miniature adults, with less experience or wisdom. They are also not as equipped as adults to engage in moral reasoning and adjust their conduct accordingly” [7]. According to the American Medical Association and American Psychiatric Association, 16- and 17-year-olds are physically incapable of making judgments as well as adults and therefore not as culpable [7]. Some, however, disagree with this assessment and argue that as a matter of justice, some juveniles should be executed.
According to Robert Blecker, a professor of criminal law at New York Law School, the very fact that some juveniles commit atrocious crimes merits the option of capital punishment. He states, “There are some people who kill so cruelly and callously and with such wanton depravity that they deserve to die, and we have an obligation to execute them,” but that juvenile executions should be done “only for the worst of the worst” [7]. For other supporters of the juvenile death penalty, it’s not a matter of forgiveness but a matter of deterrence.
Dianne Clements, founder of the Texas-based criminal justice reform organization Justice for All, believes, “You can absolutely forgive the offender and have no issue with that person being executed.” In 1991, her 13-year-old son was shot and killed by another juvenile. She says, “Executed killers do not harm again…If you execute somebody, they’re deterred” [7].
With the Supreme Court’s decision in Roper v. Simmons, this contested issue was legally settled, but as demonstrated, each side of the argument has its own merits. Socially, however, this argument will probably continue to exist over time, especially when atrocious murders are committed by juveniles and portrayed in the news media. Nonetheless, when the United States is the last Western societal nation to ban the death penalty [7], this in itself should be enough to show that this ruling was long overdue.
Sources:
[1] Simmons v. Roper, S.C. 84454 (2003).
[2] Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
[3] American Bar Association. (2004) Christopher Simmons. http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/juvjus/simmons.html
[4] Death Penalty Information Center. (2004). U.S. Supreme Court: Roper v. Simmons. http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org
[5] Greenberger, R.S. (2002, October 11). The economy: Supreme Court narrowly refuses to consider death penalty plea. The Wall Street Journal, p. A2.
[6] Gabbidon, S. L., & Greene, H. T. (2009). Race and Crime (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE
[7] Roh, J. (2005). Juvenile Death Penalty: Fair or Unfair?. http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,148888,00.html
Monday, September 28, 2009
Blog Post #3: The Case That Changed It All - In Re Gault
When someone thinks about the history and development of civil liberties in the United States, maybe the first thing that comes to mind is how some people were denied of these rights. From the lack of representation in government experienced by the colonists of the eighteenth century to the modern Civil Rights Act of the 1960’s, there have been multiple examples in our nation’s history of discrimination and due process rights denied to certain classes of people based on wealth, race and gender. What most people do not know, however, is that the same discrimination held true on the classification of age. Before 1967, children did not have the same due process rights as adults in criminal law. In fact, until the Supreme Court ruling delivered under In Re Gault, it was unclear as to what due process rights children possessed under the law.
In 1964, 15 year-old Gerald Gault was taken into custody by the sheriff of Gila County, Arizona after a neighbor, Mrs. Ora Cook, reported receiving a “lewd or indecent” telephone call. Gerald’s parents were never notified of his arrest and only became aware of it later in the evening when his mother went out looking for him and found him at the county Children’s Detention Home. According to Gerald, it was a friend who made the indecent phone call from the family’s residence and that once he heard his friend using vulgar language, he himself, hung up the phone and told the friend to leave. Judge McGhee of the Gila County Superior Court presided over the preliminary hearing the next morning, which ended when McGhee stated he would “think about it” and further remanded Gerald in custody without explanation. One week later, Judge McGhee found “that said minor is a delinquent child, and that said minor is of the age of 15 years”, and ordered him confined to the State Industrial School “for the period of his minority [that is, until 21], unless sooner discharged by due process of law” under the charge of “Lewd Phone Calls”. Essentially, Gerald was sentenced for up to 6 years of state confinement for making a lewd phone call. Ironically, at the time of the offense, had Gerald been an adult and convicted under the same statute, the punishment would have been limited to a maximum prison sentence of 2 months accompanied with a fine of $5 to $50.
Following McGhee’s ruling, Gerald’s parents petitioned the Arizona Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus for the release of their son. The case was referred back to McGhee’s own Superior Court where the writ was dismissed. Following the dismissal, Gerald’s parents appealed and the case went to the state Supreme Court on the basis that:
1. The Arizona Juvenile Code was unconstitutional because it (a) did not require the accused or the parents of the accused be notified of the charges brought against them; (b) did not require the parents be notified of hearings; and (c) allowed no appeal; and
2. The Gila County Juvenile Court denied Gerald due process because of (a) the lack of notification of either the charges or of the hearings; (b) the failure to inform Gerald of his right to counsel, right to confront an accuser, and right to remain silent; (c) the admission of "unsworn hearsay testimony"; and (d) the lack of any records of the court proceedings.
1. The Arizona Juvenile Code was unconstitutional because it (a) did not require the accused or the parents of the accused be notified of the charges brought against them; (b) did not require the parents be notified of hearings; and (c) allowed no appeal; and
2. The Gila County Juvenile Court denied Gerald due process because of (a) the lack of notification of either the charges or of the hearings; (b) the failure to inform Gerald of his right to counsel, right to confront an accuser, and right to remain silent; (c) the admission of "unsworn hearsay testimony"; and (d) the lack of any records of the court proceedings.
The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the writ and the case was appealed to the United States Supreme Court. In an 8-1 decision the Court ruled that Gerald’s commitment to the State Industrial School was a violation of the 14th Amendment due process rights, since (a) he had not been notified of the charges against him; (b) he had not been informed of his right against self-incrimination; (c) he had been denied the right to legal counsel; (d) he was not allowed to confront his accuser; and (e) he was not given the right to appeal his sentence to a higher court. With this decision, the United States Supreme Court answered the question of what due process rights children possessed under the law. Juveniles must now be accorded many of the same due process rights as adults.
Source:
In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967)
Picture:
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/
Monday, September 21, 2009
Blog Post #2: Is Closing Down DJJ Facilities the Answer?
Economically speaking, the state is not doing well right now. Among other revenue-generating and cost-reducing measures, the state sales tax has increased, state universities have raised tuition across all campuses and state employees have been forced to take monthly furlough days. When the economic conditions are what they are and the state budget is in this position of uncertainty, it is up to the citizens and state legislators to determine which state agencies and programs are worthy of the resources allocated to them. With an annual budget exceeding $380 million [1] and its operations under a court-issued consent decree [2], the merit of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation’s Division of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) has come into question.
As of March 31, 2009, DJJ housed 1,637 wards [5] at an estimated cost of approximately $234,029 per ward [6]. According to the Corrections Standards Authority (CSA), by the end of 2007, there were 2,876 vacant detention beds throughout the state’s 58 counties on any given day, more than enough to house the entire DJJ population [7]. Based on the Corrections Standards Authority estimate of $60-70 in daily costs, the cost for housing a juvenile in a county institution would range from $22,000 to $25,000 per year, representing a significant cost reduction from the current yearly cost of housing a juvenile in one of DJJ’s facilities.
With the opportunity to eliminate its responsibilities under the Farrell v. Cate consent decree and annually save the state hundreds of millions of dollars, California legislators would be wise to reexamine the usefulness of maintaining the six juvenile correctional facilities operated by the Division of Juvenile Justice.
Sources:
[1] Macallair, D., Males, M., & McCracken, C. (May 2009). Legislative Policy Study. Closing California’s Division of Juvenile Facilities: An Analysis of County Institutional Capacity, 1-25. San Francisco, CA: Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice. http://www.cjcj.org/files/closing_californias_DJF.pdf
[2] Farrell v. Cate (formally Farrell v. Allen), Case No. RG 03079344 (filed in Cal. Sup. Ct. 2004), County of Alameda. Consent decree issued 2004. Court order issued 2008.
[3] Little Hoover Commission. (2008). Juvenile Justice Reform: Realigning Responsibilities, Report#192, July 2008. Sacramento, CA: The Little Hoover Commission Reports.
[4] Legislative Analyst’s Office. (2009). Criminal Justice Realignment. 2009-10 Budget Analysis Series. Sacramento, CA: LAO Publications.
[5] Division of Juvenile Justice (2009) Characteristics of Population. December 2008. Sacramento, CA: California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Reports_Research/docs/Dec2008-Characteristics.pdf
[6] Department of Finance. (2009) Corrections and Rehabilitation. 5225 Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, California Budget 2009-10. Sacramento, CA: State of California, Department of Finance.
[7] Corrections Standards Authority. (2007). Juvenile Detention Profile Survey (4th Quarter). Sacramento, CA: California Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation, Facilities Standards and Operations Division. http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Divisions_Boards/CSA/FSO
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